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Abstract
Purpose: We augment an otherwise standard business cycle model with a rich gov-
ernment sector, and add monopolistic competition in the product market, and rigid
prices, as well as rigid wages a la Calvo (1983) in the labor market.
Design/Methodology/Approach: This specification with the nominal wage rigidity,
when calibrated to Bulgarian data after the introduction of the currency board (1999-
2018), allows the framework to reproduce better observed variability and correlations
among model variables, and those characterizing the labor market in particular.
Findings: As nominal wage frictions are incorporated, the variables become more per-
sistent, especially output, capital stock, investment and consumption, which helps the
model match data better, as compared to a setup without rigidities.
Originality/value: The computational experiments performed in this paper suggest
that wage rigidities are a quantitatively important model ingredient, which should be
taken into consideration when analysing the effects of different policies in Bulgaria,
which is a novel result.
Keywords: business cycles, monopolistic competition, rigid (Calvo) prices, rigid
1
Page 1 of 27 Journal of Economics and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Econom
ics and Developm
ent
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1 Introduction
As shown in Vasilev (2009), the standard real-business-cycle (RBC) model does not capture
well model dynamics for Bulgaria. In other words, an important aspect from the real world is
missing from the model setup. One explanation for the model failure along the labor market
dimension could be the way product markets are modelled; In other words, the perfect-
competition assumption that imposed everywhere in the firm problem in the RBC model
might be too restrictive for a transition economy such as Bulgaria. Instead, as demonstrated
in Lozev et al. (2011) and Vladova (2016), imperfections in the product and factor markets
are observed in Bulgaria, together with the presence of price- and wage-rigidities, and those
patterns should be taken as stylized facts in theoretical models.
In light of this evidence, in this paper we take all those phenomena seriously, and incor-
porate those rigidities in our modelling strategy, which effectively leads to the adoption of
the New Keynesian approach,1 which departs from perfect competition in goods and factors
market; as a result, the prices of the factors of production no longer will equal their marginal
products. In addition, instead of a stand-in firm, there will be imperfect competition in the
intermediate goods firms, and the differentiated intermediate goods will be then combined
into a final good, which is produced by a perfectly-competitive firm.2 We can then compare
and contrast how a model with rigidities compares to the standard RBC model without
rigidities, when it comes to capturing the dynamics of aggregate labor market variables.
Another important difference from the RBC model is that in the setup in this model the
prices of production inputs depend on the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated
intermediate goods, which in turn reflects the market power of monopolistically-competitive
firms to set prices. The distortion driven by the industry structure pushes the prices of labor
and capital below their marginal products. More specifically, as shown in Rotemberd and
Woodford (1995), the higher the market power of monopolistic firms, the higher the mark-
up, and as a result, the greater the difference between the marginal product of labor and
1This modelling approach was initially developed by Rotemberg (1982), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987),
and Rotemberg and Woodford (1992, 1995), among others.
2In other words, the final stage is identical to the standard RBC model.
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capital and their prices.3 In addition, with imperfect competition in the output market, a
technology shock affecting the marginal product of capital and labor leads to lower reaction
of both the real wage rate and the real interest rate (compared to the perfectly competitive
environment). As a result, the owners of the two factors of production will perceive a smaller
effect from the productivity shock, and that will drive down the use of labor and capital, and
that would lead to lower output at intermediate- and final-good level. In turn, the model no
longer generates efficient allocations in equilibrium.
Another important novelty in this paper, which distinguishes the model setup from the
standard New Keynesian (NK) model, would be the presence of rigidities in the wage de-
termination process a la Erceg et al. (2000), Canzoneri et al. (2005), and Christiano et al.
(2005). The stickiness in nominal wages is an important ingredient in the transmission of
technology shocks, and a rigidity which could potentially generate employment and wage
fluctuations similar to the ones exhibited in Bulgarian data.4 Importantly, relative to the
rest of the NK literature, we allow for the capital accumulation motive to work alongside
nominal rigidities. In the absence of restraint on capital (in the form of investment adjust-
ment costs), and in the absence of active monetary policy, which is the case of Bulgaria, the
neoclassical mechanisms seems to dominate quantitatively, with the nominal rigidities being
only secondary in importance. In other words, nominal rigidities - despite being a relevant
feature of reality - are not the primary factor behind the observed business cycle fluctuations
in Bulgaria.
Overall, allowing for nominal wage rigidities in the model improves the model performance
against data, and in addition this extended setup marginally dominates the standard RBC
model framework without wage frictions, e.g., Vasilev (2009, 2019). Therefore, the compu-
3As pointed out in Torres (2013), this is a direct consequence of the assumption that the elasticity of
substitution between differentiated goods is strictly greater than unity.
4In order to accommodate those, it will be also assumed that labor services are differentiated among
households. This assumption implies that households also possess certain market power in setting their
nominal wages. This assumption could be easily rationalized with the presence of labor unions, as well
as certain provisions in the Bulgarian Labor code, which protect workers’ interests in labor disputes with
employers. Both explanations are empirically plausible in Bulgaria, as demonstrated in Paskaleva (2016).
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tational experiments performed in this paper for Bulgaria in the period 1999-20185 suggest
that Calvo wages are a quantitatively important model ingredient, which should be taken
into consideration when analysing the effects of different policies. This is a contribution in
itself, as this is the first dynamic general equilibrium model with Calvo wages done for Bul-
garia, which - following Canova (2007) - has been subjected to a variety of statistical tests.
Overall, micro-founded theoretical dynamic general equilibrium models are therefore to be
considered as very important devices in the macro modellers’ toolboxes, as those setups
provide the necessary disciplining of data and allows researchers to discriminate between
different alternative explanation, as well as break any observational equivalence problems,
such as the ones pertaining to labor market dynamics.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model framework
and defines the decentralized monopolistically-competitive equilibrium system. Section 3
discusses the calibration procedure, and Section 4 presents the steady-state model solution.
Sections 5 proceeds with the out-of-steady-state dynamics of model variables, and compared
the simulated second moments of theoretical variables against their empirical counterparts.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model Setup
There is a continuum of ex ante identical one-member households distributed uniformly on
the unit interval, and indexed by j. Final output is obtained through the aggregation of
intermediate good outputs, in an environment of perfect competition, and can be used for
household consumption, investment, or government purchases. In contrast, in the interme-
diate goods sector, there is monopolistic competition with free entry, which means that each
intermediate good is produced by a single monopolistic firm, which has market power and
sets the price of the particular good they produce at a mark-up above their marginal cost.
Lastly, the government is levying taxes on consumption, labor and capital income in order
5This period was chosen as it is a period of macroeconomic stability.
6”Observational equivalence problems” occur in cases when similar impulse responses of model variables
are produced as a result of a technology shock, such as ones generated by an a-theoretical unrestricted or
structural VARs.
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to finance spending on government purchases and lump-sum government transfers.
2.1 Households’ problem
Household j maximizes the expected discounted utility, which is of the form7
U = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
c1−σt
1− σ
− h
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
}
, (1)
where Et is the expectations operator as of period t, 0 < β < 1 denotes the discount factor, ct
is consumption of household j in period t, ht are the hours worked by household j in period
t, σ is the relative risk aversion parameter (and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution parameter), and parameter ϕ denotes the curvature of the function capturing
the disutility of hours worked.
The household starts with a unit endowment of time in each time period, and a positive
endowment of physical capital, k0, in period 0, which is rented to the firm at the nominal
rental rate Rt, that is, before-tax capital income equals Rtkt. Therefore, each household
can decide to invest in capital to augment the capital stock, which evolves according to the
following law of motion:
kt+1 = it + (1− δ)kt, (2)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
In addition to the rental income, each household owns an equal share of the final-good-
producing firm, and thus has a legal claim to the firms’ nominal profit, Πt. Household j’s
period t budget constraint is then
Pt[(1 + τ
c)ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt] = (1− τ y)[Wtht +Rtkt + Πt] + Ptgtt, (3)
where Pt is the aggregate price index, τ
c, τ y are consumption and income tax rate, respec-
tively, and gtt are per household government transfers.
7To simplify notation, we will suppress the j index and use smallcase letters to denote individual alloca-
tions, and capital letters for aggregate quantities.
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The problem faced by each household is then to choose {ct, ht, kt+1,Wt}∞t=0 to maximize
utility subject to budget constaint.8 The first-order conditions for the allocations are as
follows:
ct : c
−σ
t = λtPt(1 + τ
c) (4)
ht : h
ϕ
t = λtWt(1− τ y) (5)
kt+1 : λtPt = βEtλt+1[(1− δ)Pt+1 + (1− τ y)Rt+1] (6)
TV C : lim
t→∞
βtλtkt+1 = 0. (7)
The interpretation of the optimality conditions above is standard: the first states that at the
margin, optimal consumption is characterized by the balance between the benefit of extra
consumption utility and the cost in terms of shadow price of wealth. The second equation
balances the disutility of extra work and the benefit in terms of extra income, weighted by
consumption utility. The third equation, the so-called Euler equation, describes how capital
should be allocated in any two congruent periods. The last condition, the ”Transversality
condition,” is a boundary constraint, in order to rule out explosive solution paths.
In addition, since labor can be a differentiated product among households, this implies that
households have some market power when setting wages. As in Christiano et al. (2005), and
Canzoneri et al. (2005), each household supplies differentiated labor services in a market
structure of monopolistic competition. These labor services are rented to a representative
firm that aggregates these different types of labor hj into a single labor input H. As in
Junior (2016), the labor-aggregating firm is assumed to use the following constant-elasticity-
of-substitution (CES) technology:
Ht =
(∫ 1
0
h
ψW−1
ψW
j,t dj
) ψW
ψW−1
, (8)
where ψW is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor services and hj,t is the
amount of of differentiated labor hours supplied by household j. Each type of labor hours j
is paid for with a nominal wage Wj,t. The problem of the labor-aggregating firm is then to
maximize its static profit:
max
hj,t
WtHt −
∫ 1
0
Wj,thj,tdj (9)
8We postpone the discussion of optimal wage-setting until later.
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s.t. the aggregation constraint above, or
max
hj,t
Wt
(∫ 1
0
h
ψW−1
ψW
j,t dj
) ψW
ψW−1
−
∫ 1
0
Wj,thj,tdj. (10)
The first-order condition for each type of differentiated labor services is
Wt
(
ψW
ψW − 1
)(∫ 1
0
h
ψW−1
ψW
j,t dj
) ψW
ψW−1
−1(
ψW − 1
ψW
)
h
ψW−1
ψW
−1
j,t −Wj,t = 0 (11)
or,
Wt
(∫ 1
0
h
ψW−1
ψW
j,t dj
) 1
ψW−1
h
− 1
ψW
j,t −Wj,t = 0 (12)
Next, noting that we can express aggregate hours as follows:
H
1
ψW
t =
(∫ 1
0
h
ψW−1
ψW
j,t dj
) 1
ψW−1
, (13)
so we can replace it in the following equation:
WtH
1
ψW
t h
− 1
ψW
j,t −Wj,t = 0. (14)
After some algebra, we can express the demand for hj as follows:
hj,t = Ht
(
Wt
Wj,t
)ψW
(15)
Substitute now this expression back into aggregate hours to solve for the aggregate wage
rate as a function of household-specific wage rates
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
W 1−ψWj,t dj
) 1
1−ψW
(16)
In terms of the wage rigidity, in each period, 1− θW households, chosen independently and
at random, optimally define/set their wages in nominal terms. The remaining households,
θW , follow a wage stickiness rule a la Calvo (1983), and keep the same wage level as the
previous period, or, Wj,t = Wj,t−1. In particular, the 1− θW fraction of households that can
choose wage levels in period t knows that, even setting optimal nominal wage W ∗j,t for the
period, it faces a θNW probability of these wages remaining fixed for N future period. When
household j chooses W ∗j,t to solve the following problem
9
max
W ∗j,t
Et
∞∑
t=0
(βθW )
t
[
...− h
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
− λt(...−Wj, t∗ht)
]
(17)
9As in Junior (2016), we keep only the relevant terms in the problem below.
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s.t.
ht = Ht
(
Wt
Wj,t
)ψW
(18)
Substituting the expression into the objective function
max
W ∗j,t
Et
∞∑
t=0
(βθW )
t
[
...− 1
1 + ϕ
[
Ht
(
Wt
Wj,t
)ψW ]1+ϕ
− λt(...−W ∗j,tHt
(
Wt
Wj,t
)ψW
)
]
(19)
After some algebraic manipulations, and using that λt = c
−σ
t /Pt, we can derive the expression
for the optimal wage equation set by household j:
W ∗j,t =
(
ψW
ψW − 1
)
Et
∞∑
t=0
(βθW )
tcσt h
ϕ
t Pt (20)
As 1 − θW fraction of households chooses the same nominal wages, W ∗j,t = W ∗t , and the
mass of remaining households, θW , set their wage equal to the nominal wage observed in the
previous period. Thus, the aggregate nominal wage can be expressed as
W 1−ψWt =
∫ θW
0
W 1−ψWt−1 dj +
∫ 1
θW
W ∗1−ψWt dj
W 1−ψWt = [jW
1−ψW
t−1 ]
θW
0 + [W
∗1−ψW
t ]
1
θW
W 1−ψWt = θWW
1−ψW
t−1 + (1− θW )W
∗1−ψW
t ,
hence the aggregate nominal wage rule is:
Wt = [θWW
1−ψW
t−1 + (1− θW )W
∗1−ψW
t ]
1
1−ψW (21)
2.2 Firms
The modelling approach of the industry structure in the setup follows Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), with a continuum of differentiated goods. In turn, these differentiated goods are
then aggregated into a single final goods, which is consumed by the households. Each firm
produces a single intermediate good that the final producer then uses as an input in the
production of the final good via a CES output aggregator function. The final good producer
takes prices as given, while intermediate good producers have power over setting their own
prices.
9
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2.2.1 Final goods production sector (retail)
The functional form chosen for the aggregation technology is
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
ψ−1
ψ
j,t dj
) ψ
ψ−1
, (22)
where Yt is aggregate output (the product of the retailer) in period t, and Yj,t, j ∈ [0, 1] is the
output of intermediate (wholesale) good j, and ψ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution
between the differentiated wholesale goods.
Let Pj,t denote the nominal price of wholesale good j, the price of each wholesale good
is taken as a given by retail firms. The problem faced by each retail firm is then to
max
Yj,t
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pj,tYj,tdj (23)
s.t. (22), or when plugging that expression back into the objective function, to
max
Yj,t
Pt
(∫ 1
0
Y
ψ−1
ψ
j,t dj
) ψ
ψ−1
−
∫ 1
0
Pj,tYj,tdj (24)
Taking the first-order condition, and after some algebra we obtain
Yj,t = Yt
(
Pt
Pj,t
)ψ
. (25)
In other words, the individual demand is proportional to aggregate demand, and inversely
proportional to relative price level. Now subsitute this expression back into aggregate output
to obtain the expression for the price of the final (retail) goods in term of the prices of the
intermediate goods:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−ψj,t dj
) 1
1−ψ
, (26)
which is also the aggregate price index.
2.2.2 Intermediate goods production sector (wholesale)
As pointed out earlier, each wholesale firms sell their differentiated goods to the stand-in re-
tail (final-goods) firm. Intermediate-good producers will be assumed to possess some market
10
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power and will have some power in setting the price of their product (facing a downward-
sloping demand for their product). In addition, it will be assumed that fixed (entry or
period) costs do not exist.10 Since the retailer has constant-returns-to-scale technology, its
marginal cost is independent of quantity produced. Furthermote, the marginal cost function
coincides with the average cost function, and total cost equals the product of marginal cost
times quantity. Net, the retail firm’s problem can be split in two parts. In the first, the
prices of capital and labor are taken as given, and the firm minimizes total cost subject to
the production function (the technology constraint), or
min
ht,kt
Wtht +Rtkt (27)
s.t
Yt = Atk
α
t h
1−α
t (28)
The FOCs are
ht : (1− α)µtAtkαt h−αt = Wt (29)
kt : αµtAtk
α−1
t h
1−α
t = Rt, (30)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the constraint. With µt = MCj,t the equation
above become
ht = (1− α)MCj,t
Yj,t
Wt
(31)
kt = αMCj,t
Yj,t
Rt
(32)
The expressions above are the optimal demand for the two inputs (capital and labor) by
each wholesale firm. Deriving the total and marginal cost function can be done from the
dual problem - the profit maximization one:
max
ht,kt
πt = Atk
α
t h
1−α
t Pj,t −Wtht −Rtkt (33)
10Actually, that assumption is not that relevant - we can have an equivalent representation with fixed
”period costs” and free entry, which leads the firm to set price above mc to cover the amount of the fixed
costs and have 0 profit. This is the representation utilized in Torres (2013).
11
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FOCs:
kt : Rt = α
Yj,t
kt
(34)
ht : Wt = (1− α)
Yj,t
ht
(35)
After some algebra, we arrive at the following expression:11
MCj,t =
1
At
(
Wt
1− α
)1−α(
Rt
α
)α
(37)
Next, the second stage of the problem of the wholesale firm j is optimally-setting the price
of its product. This firm decides how much to produce in each period a la Calvo (Calvo
1983). More specifically, in each period, each wholesale firm has a θ probability of keeping
the price of its good unchanged in the next period (Pj,t = Pj,t−1) and a 1− θ probability of
optimally setting its price. Therefore, the problem of a wholesale firm j that is able to reset
the price of its good is
max
P ∗j,t
Et
∞∑
t=0
(βθ)t(P ∗j,tYj,t − TCj,t+i) (38)
s.t. demand constraint, or
max
P ∗j,t
Et
∞∑
t=0
(βθ)t(P ∗j,tYt
(
Pt
Pj,t
)ψ
− Yt
(
Pt
Pj,t
)ψ
MCj,t+i) (39)
The first-order condition (after some algebra)
P ∗j,t =
(
ψ
ψ − 1
)
Et
∞∑
t=0
(βθ)tMCj,t (40)
Note that all wholesale firms that fix their price have the same mark-up on the same marginal
cost. Thus, in all periods, P ∗j,t is the same price for all the 1− θ firms that set their prices.
11Note that the expression below is consistent with the requirement that
MCj,t = TCj,t/Yj,t. (36)
12
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Following the argument in Junior (2016), the aggregate price level is
P 1−ψt =
∫ θ
0
P 1−ψt−1 dj +
∫ 1
θ
P ∗1−ψt dj
P 1−ψt = [jP
1−ψ
t−1 ]
θ
0 + [jP
∗1−ψ
t ]
1
θ
P 1−ψt = θP
1−ψ
t−1 + (1− θ)P
∗1−ψ
t
Pt = [θP
1−ψ
t−1 + (1− θ)P
∗1−ψ
t ]
1
1−ψ (41)
Note that since there is a continuum of intermediate good producers, and the share that can
reset its price (and the group that cannot) is chosen randomly, regardless of when each firm
last altered its price. As a result, the distribution of prices among firms does not change
between periods.
2.3 Government
In the model setup, the government is levying taxes on labor and capital income, as well as
consumption in order to finance spending on government purchases and government transfers.
The government budget constraint is as follows:12
τ cct + τ
y(wtht + rtkt) = g
t
t + g
c
t (42)
Tax rates and government consumption-to-output ratio would be chosen to match the average
share in data, and government transfers would be determined residually.
2.4 Stochastic process
Total factor productivity, At, is assumed to follow AR(1) processes in logs, in particular
lnAt+1 = (1− ρa) lnA0 + ρa lnAt + εat+1,
where A0 > 0 is steady-state level of the total factor productivity process, 0 < ρa < 1 is
the first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and εat ∼ iidN(0, σ2a) are random shocks
to the total factor productivity progress. Hence, the innovations εat represent unexpected
changes in the total factor productivity process.
12Given that there is a unit mass of households, individual and total allocations are identical.
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2.5 Dynamic Monopolistically-Competitive Equilibrium (DMCE)
Given the processes followed by the stochastic process {At}∞t=0, average tax rates {τ c, τ y},
endowments k0∀j, the decentralized dynamic competitive equilibrium is a list of sequences
{ct, it, ht}∞t=0, a sequence of government purchases and transfers {gct , gtt}∞t=0, price level se-
quence {Pt}∞t=0 and prices {wt, rt}∞t=0 such that (i) each household j maximizes its utility
function subject to its budget constraint, (ii) the representative final-good firm maximizes
profit; (iii) intermediate-good firms maximize profit; (iv) government budget is balanced in
each period; (v) all markets clear.
3 Data and M del Calibration
To calibrate the model to Bulgarian data, we will focus on the period after the introduction
of the currency board (1999-2018). Annual data on output, consumption and investment was
collected from National Statistical Institute (2019), while the real interest rate is taken from
Bulgarian National Bank Statistical Database (2019). The calibration strategy described in
this section follows a long-established tradition in modern macroeconomics: first, the dis-
count factor, β = 0.982, is set to match the steady-state capital-to-output ratio in Bulgaria
over the period, which is k/y = 3.491. The labor share parameter, α = 0.429, was computed
as the average value of labor income in aggregate output over the period 1999-2018. The
depreciation rate of physical capital in Bulgaria, δ = 0.05, was estimated as the average
depreciation rate over the period 1999-2018. The curvature parameters of consumption and
leisure components in the household’s utility function are set to σ = 2 and ϕ = 1.5 in order
to generate plausible value for aggregate labor supply elasticity. The average income tax
rate was set to τ y = 0.1, and the tax rate on consumption, τ c = 0.2, are set to their values
over the period 1999-2018.
Next, due to the lack of more recent data, the elasticity of substitution between differentiated
intermediate goods was set to ψ = 5 to generate the average mark-up of 25 percent esti-
mated by Korosi et al. (2004) for Bulgaria. Similarly, the elasticity of substitution between
differentiated labor services was set to ψW = 7 to generate a wedge between marginal utility
of consumption and the marginal disutility of leisure of 17 percent, which is the average
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inter-industry wage difference. The price stickiness parameter was set to θ = 0.74 following
Paskaleva (2016)’s estimate on the share of firms that do not change prices. Similarly, as
in Lozev et al. (2011) the wage stickiness parameter, θW = 0.68, was set to the share of
firms that set wages to the previous period wages.13 Lastly, the process followed by total
factor productivity is estimated from the detrended series by running an AR(1) regression
and saving the residuals. Table 1 below summarizes the values of all model parameters used
in the paper.
Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Description Method
β 0.982 Discount factor Calibrated
α 0.429 Capital Share Data average
1− α 0.571 Labor Share Calibrated
δ 0.050 Depreciation rate on physical capital Data average
ϕ 1.500 Curvature, disutility of work Set
σ 2.000 Curvature, utility of consumption Set
h 0.333 Share of time spent working Data average
τ c 0.200 VAT/consumption tax rate Data average
τ y 0.100 Average tax rate on income Data average
θ 0.740 Price stickiness parameter Data average
θW 0.680 Wage stickiness parameter Data average
ψ 5.000 Elasticity of substitution, intermediate goods Calibrated
ψW 7.000 Elasticity of substitution, differentiated labor Calibrated
ρa 0.701 AR(1) parameter, total factor productivity Estimated
σa 0.044 st.dev, total factor productivity Estimated
13Al those values are consistent with the values of those parameters in the literature for the US and other
EU countries.
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4 Steady-State
Once the values of model parameters were obtained,14 the steady-state equilibrium system
solved, the ”big ratios” can be compared to their averages in Bulgarian data. The results are
reported in Table 2 below. The model matches consumption-to-output ratio by construction;
The investment and government purchases ratios are free variables, and are also closely
approximated. The shares of income are also identical to those in data, which is an artifact
of the assumptions imposed on functional form (Cobb-Douglas) of the aggregate production
function. The after-tax return, net of depreciation, r̃ = (1 − τ y)r − δ, is also very closely
captured by the model.
Table 2: Data Averages and Long-run Solution
Variable Description Data Model
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.674 0.674
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175
gc/y Government cons-to-output ratio 0.159 0.151
wh/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429
r̃ After-tax net return on capital 0.056 0.057
5 Out of steady-state model dynamics
Since the model does not have an analytical solution for the equilibrium behavior of variables
outside their steady-state values, we need to solve the model numerically. This is done by
log-linearizing the original equilibrium (non-linear) system of equations around the steady-
state. This transformation produces a first-order system of stochastic difference equations.
First, we study the dynamic behavior of model variables to an isolated shock to the total
factor productivity process, and then we fully simulate the model to compare how the second
14The steady-state results for a model with no rigidities and perfect competition are very close, and thus
not presented.
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moments of the model perform when compared against their empirical counterparts. Special
focus is put on the cyclical behavior of labor market variables.
5.1 Impulse Response Analysis
This subsection documents the impulse responses of model variables to a 1% surprise innova-
tion to technology. The impulse response function (IRFs) are presented in Fig. 1 on the next
page against the IRFs from a model without nominal price and wage rigidities.15 As a result
of the one-time unexpected positive shock to total factor productivity, output increases. This
expands the availability of resources in the economy, so consumption, investment and gov-
ernment consumption also increase upon impact. As a result of the increase in productivity,
the real interest rate increases as well, and households increase their capital accumulation.
Wages also increase in real terms more with Calvo wages and prices. Importantly, compared
to the perfectly competitive case, the effects over aggregate output is smaller upon impact,
as demonstrated in Junior (2016), and Torres (2013), since the inefficiencies produced by
imperfect competition at intermediate level itself reduce the effect of the technology shock.
In addition, with nominal wage frictions, model variables become more persistent, especially
output, capital stock and consumption. The ”adjustment stickiness” of wages also causes
households’ labor supply to initially increase more than in other models, e.g. the standard
RBC, and New Keynesian models without wage frictions, as shown in Junior (2016). Phys-
ical capital also varies more due to its complementarity with labor.
Over time, as the effect of the shock wanes, the return on capital decreases, which drives
down investment and capital accumulation back to their old steady-state values. The other
model variables return to their old values in a monotone manner as well as the effect of the
one-time surprise innovation in technology dies out.
5.2 Simulation and moment-matching
We will now simulate the model 10,000 times for the length of the data horizon. Both
empirical and model simulated data is detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filter.
15The results are insensitive to the degree of wage persistence, as captured by parameter ψW .
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a 1% surprise innovation in technology
Table 3 on the next page summarizes the second moments of data (relative volatilities to
output, and contemporaneous correlations with output) versus the same moments computed
from the model-simulated data at annual frequency. We compare side by side the moments
from a model with nominal rigidities versus a model with no rigidites and perfect compe-
tition (”Benchmark model”). The two models match quite well the absolute volatility of
output. However, both models slightly overestimates the variability in consumption, and
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more substantially that of investment.16 Still, the model is qualitatively consistent with the
finding the consumption varies less than output, and investment varies more than output.
By construction, government spending in the model varies as much as in data.
Table 3: Business Cycle Moments
Data Model Benchmark Model
(with Calvo wages) (w/o rigidities)
σy 0.05 0.05 0.05
σc/σy 0.55 0.92 0.84
σi/σy 1.77 5.25 2.36
σg/σy 1.21 1.00 1.00
σh/σy 0.63 0.53 0.29
σw/σy 0.83 1.49 0.81
σy/h/σy 0.86 1.49 0.81
corr(c, y) 0.85 0.97 0.89
corr(i, y) 0.61 0.53 0.80
corr(g, y) 0.31 1.00 1.00
corr(h, y) 0.49 0.73 0.33
corr(w, y) -0.01 0.94 0.96
corr(h, y/h) -0.14 0.86 0.96
With respect to the labor market variables, the variability of employment predicted by the
model with Calvo wages is much closer to that in data, compared to the benchmark model
without rigidities; however, the variability of wages in the Calvo-wage model is much higher
than that in data. Next, in terms of contemporaneous correlations, the model with Calvo-
wages slightly over-predicts the pro-cyclicality of the main aggregate variables - consumption
and government consumption. This, however, is a common limitation of this class of models.
In addition, the model with Calvo wages is a bit better than the alternative. Along the la-
16This shortcoming of the models could be explained by structural factors in Bulgaria, such as privatization
of state assets, and the short annual time series for Bulgaria. In addition, public investment in infrastructure
has been also substantial in the last few years due to the EU accession funds.
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bor market dimension, the contemporaneous correlation of employment with output is of the
right sign, but the model predicts it to be quite strong, while in data the linear relationship
is more moderate. With wages, the model predicts strong cyclicality, while wages in data
are acyclical. The same is true with the contemporaneous correlation between productivity
and hours. Again, the Calvo model is marginally better than the alternative setup without
rigidities along this dimension of data.
In the next subsection, we investigate the dynamic correlation between labor market vari-
ables at different leads and lags, thus evaluating how well the model matches the phase
dynamics among variables. In addition, the autocorrelation functions (ACFs) of empiri-
cal data, obtained from an unrestricted VAR(1) are put under scrutiny and compared and
contrasted to the simulated counterparts generated from the model.
5.3 Auto- and cross-correlation
This subsection discusses the auto-(ACFs) and cross-correlation functions (CCFs) of the
major model variables. The coefficients empirical ACFs and CCFs at different leads and
lags are presented in Table 4 against the simulated AFCs and CCFs. For the sake of brevity,
we present only results for the model with Calvo wages only. Following Canova (2007), this
comparison is used as a goodness-of-fit measure. As seen from Table 4 on the next page, the
model compares well vis-a-vis data. Empirical ACFs for output and investment are slightly
outside the confidence band predicted by the model, while the ACFs for total factor produc-
tivity and household consumption are well-approximated by the model.
The persistence of labor market variables are also well-described by the model dynamics:
the ACFs unemployment and wages are close to the simulated ones until the third lag. Same
holds true for output and investment. The ACF for consumption is well-captured only until
the first lag. Overall, the model with persistence a la Calvo (1983) in nominal wages gen-
erates the right persistence in model variables, and is able to respond to the criticism in
Nelson and Plosser (1992), Cogley and Nason (1995) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996),
who argue that this class of models do not have a strong internal propagation mechanism
besides the strong persistence in the TFP process. Furthermore, the Calvo nominal wage
20
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Table 4: Autocorrelations for Bulgarian data and the model economy
k
Method Statistic 0 1 2 3
Data corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.765 0.552 0.553
Model corr(ut, ut−k) 1.000 0.818 0.629 0.442
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.035) (0.063) (0.084)
Data corr(ht, ht−k) 1.000 0.484 0.009 0.352
Model corr(ht, ht−k) 1.000 0.818 0.629 0.442
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.035) (0.063) (0.084)
Data corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.810 0.663 0.479
Model corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.815 0.625 0.438
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.037) (0.067) (0.091)
Data corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.702 0.449 0.277
Model corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.814 0.624 0.437
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.038) (0.070) (0.096)
Data corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.971 0.952 0.913
Model corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.815 0.625 0.438
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.037) (0.067) (0.091)
Data corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.810 0.722 0.594
Model corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.816 0.624 0.434
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.038) (0.069) (0.095)
Data corr(wt, wt−k) 1.000 0.760 0.783 0.554
Model corr(wt, wt−k) 1.000 0.816 0.627 0.441
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.036) (0.065) (0.087)
mechanism dominates other non-Walrasian models such as Vasilev (2016, 2017b,d).
Next, as seen from Table 5 on the next page, over the business cycle, in data labor pro-
ductivity leads employment. The model nominal wage persistence, however, cannot account
for this fact. In this model, as well as in the standard RBC model a technology shock can
be regarded as a factor shifting the labor demand curve, while holding the labor supply
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curve constant. Therefore, the effect between employment and labor productivity is only a
contemporaneous one. Still, the model with nominal wage persistence a la Calvo (1983) is
a clear improvement over the perfectly-competitive labor market paradigm used in Vasilev
(2009, 2019).
Table 5: Dynamic correlations for Bulgarian data and the model economy
k
Statistic -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Data corr(ht, (y/h)t−k) -0.342 -0.363 -0.187 -0.144 0.475 0.470 0.346
Model corr(ht, (y/h)t−k) 0.034 0.033 0.029 0.960 0.030 0.034 0.035
(s.e.) (0.732) (0.643) (0.531) (0.098) (0.534) (0.645) (0.734)
Data corr(ht, wt−k) 0.355 0.452 0.447 0.328 -0.040 -0.390 -0.57
Model corr(ht, wt−k) 0.034 0.033 0.029 0.960 0.030 0.034 0.035
(s.e.) (0.732) (0.643) (0.531) (0.098) (0.534) (0.645) (0.734)
6 Conclusions
We augment an otherwise standard DSGE model with a rich government sector, and add
monopolistic competition in the product market, an rigid prices, as well as rigid wages
a la Calvo (1983) in the labor market. This specification with the nominal wage rigidity,
when calibrated to Bulgarian data after the introduction of the currency board (1999-2018),
allows the framework to reproduce better observed variability and correlations among model
variables, and those characterizing the labor market in particular. These results suggest that
technology shocks seem to be the dominant source of economic fluctuations, but nominal
wage rigidities a la Calvo (1983), as well as the monopolistic competition in the product
market, might be important factors of relevance to the labor market dynamics in Bulgaria,
and such imperfections should be incorporated in any model that studies cyclical movements
in employment and wages.
Therefore, the empirical findings that the theoretical setup with Calvo wages fits data better,
can be interpreted as a validation of the model, and a rejection of the model without nominal
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wage rigidities and perfect competition in the case of Bulgarian data for the period 1999-
2018. Overall, micro-founded theoretical dynamic general equilibrium models are therefore
to be considered as very important devices in the macro modellers’ toolboxes, as those setups
provide the necessary disciplining of data and allows researchers to discrimi- nate between
different alternative explanation, as well as break any observational equivalence problems,
e.g. in cases when similar impulse responses of model variables are produced as a result of
a technology shock, such as ones generated by an a-theoretical VARs.
As a result of the monopolistic competition the effects of technology shocks on output are
smaller upon impact, as compared to the perfectly competitive case, since the inefficiencies
produced by imperfect competition itself reduce the effect of the technology shock. More
specifically, the deviation from a perfectly competitive paradigm leads to an inefficient al-
location of labor and capital inputs (market failures), resulting in a lower equilibrium level
for the economy, and lower effects from a productivity shock. As nominal wage frictions
are incorporated, the variables become more persistent, especially output, capital stock and
consumption. Still, the model suffers from some of the usual shortcomings inherent in this
class of DSGE models. As a suggestion for future research, the model might be extended to
accommodate other important (and real) frictions in the labor market, possibly along the
lines of Vasilev (2016, 2017b, 2018).
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